New Explanations for the Firm Size-Wage Premium by Nien-Pen Liu & Dachrahn Wu
New Explanations for the Firm Size-Wage Premium 
Nien-Pen Liu Dachrahn Wu
PhD candidate, Graduate Institute of Industrial
Economics, National Central University, Taiwan,
R.O.C.
Department of Economics, National Central University,
Taiwan, R.O.C.
Abstract
This paper contributes some new explanations for the firm size-wage premium. We find that
if the difference between the two types¡¦ status quo utility levels is large enough, then the
small firm will reject the good agent more often than the large firm. The reason behind this
result is that the capital-like resource restriction interferes with the willingness of the small
firm to mitigate the information rent caused by the countervailing incentive. Moreover, when
the countervailing incentive exists and when both firms want to delegate the tasks to both
types, the good agent produces more output in the large firm and therefore gets a higher
payment. These findings support the labor quality explanation that larger firms employ
higher-quality workers and the productivity hypothesis that workers are more productive in
large firms and therefore ask for higher wages, but from a kind of markedly different
reasoning.
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In spite of the large and growing importance of the firm size-wage premium, previous 
attempts in the literature to account for this premium have had limited success.  
There still remains a large, significant, and unexplained premium paid to workers of 
large firms (e.g. Troske, 1999).     
This paper proposes a contractual game to analyze the employment problems 
confronted by a large firm and a small firm.  It is assumed that the only distinction 
between a large firm and a small firm is different sizes of capital-like resource 
endowments.
1    We find that if the difference between the two types’ status quo utility 
levels is large enough,
2 then the small firm will reject the good agent more often than 
the large firm.    The reason behind this result is not that the surplus generated by the 
small firm and the good agent cannot afford the good type’s status quo utility, but 
rather the capital-like resource restriction interferes with the willingness of the small 
firm to mitigate the information rent caused by the countervailing incentive.  
Moreover, when the countervailing incentive exists and when both firms want to 
delegate the tasks to both types, the good agent produces more output in the large firm 
and therefore gets a higher payment.     
The findings alluded to above contribute some new explanations for the firm 
size-wage premium.    Under the results that small firms will reject good agents more 
often than large firms and good agents are more productive in large firms, this paper 
supports the labor quality explanation that larger firms employ higher-quality workers 
(e.g. Hamermesh, 1993; Brown and Medoff, 1989; Reilly, 1995) and the productivity 
hypothesis that workers are more productive in large firms and therefore ask for 
higher wages (e.g. Oi and Idson, 1999), but from a kind of markedly different 
reasoning. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 introduces the 
asymmetric information model to delineate firms’ employment problems.  The 
explanations for the firm size-wage premium are provided in Section 3.  Section 4 
concludes.      
 
2.  The  Model 
 
Consider two firms that are endowed with different sizes of capital-like resources   
and  , respectively, where  .    Hence, the firm endowed with   ( ) is 
called the large (small) firm.    Each firm wants to delegate an agent to produce some 
units (denoted by  ) of a certain product.  Assume that the output   and the 
capital-like resource    are complements.    Therefore, the revenue function (of both 
firms) can be characterized as follows. 
             where 
cb q
cs q cs cb q q > cb q cs q
q q
c q
} ) , (min{ ) , ( c c q q S q q R = 0 " , 0 ' < > S S  and  .  0 ) 0 ( = S
The agent’s production cost is  q q C θ θ = ) , ( , where θ  is a constant marginal 
cost that is observed by the agent, but unobservable to the firm.  Nonetheless, it is 
                                                 
1 Economies of scale and other financial advantages (e.g. lower interest rate) are often mentioned to 
explain why large firms might invest more in both human capital and physical capital.    The point is 
that large firms can spread the fixed costs of their investments across more output and agents. 
2 Type-dependent utilities (or countervailing incentives) with interesting implications have appeared 
successively in Lewis and Sappington (1989) for a regulation model with fixed cost, and in Laffont and 
Tirole (1990) for the regulation of bypass, etc. Jullien (2000) provided a general theory of 
type-dependent reservation utility with a continuum of types. 
  1common knowledge that the cost function is either:     
            q q C θ θ = ) , (    with probability ν                            ( 1 )  
or 
            q q C θ θ = ) , (    with probability  ν − 1 ,                         ( 2 )  
where  θ θ < .  Let us call the low cost (high cost) agent the good (bad) agent.  If 
the firm pays   for producing q units of the good, then the benefits of the good 
agent and the bad agent are 
t
q t U θ − =  and  q t U θ − = , respectively, and the profit 
function (of both firms) is  t q q S c − = }) , (min{ π .  For simplicity, we normalize the 
status quo utility of the bad agent to zero, and we assume that the status quo utility 
level of the good agent is  .   0 0 ≥ U
    In the case of complete information, the production levels 
* q  and 
*
q  are 
given by the following first-order conditions: 
            θ = ) ( '
* q S                                                ( 3 )  
and  
            . ) ( '
*
θ = q S                                                ( 4 )  
In order to bring the influence of the capital-like resource restriction on firms’  
choices (of whether to delegate a task to an agent) under asymmetric information into 
focus, we make the following assumption: 
           
* q q q q cs
CI
cb = > ≥ ,                                        ( 5 )  
where   will be defined later.  Hence, both firms make the same decision on 
whether to reject a good agent under complete information.  We further assume that 
CI q
ν  is not too high so that it is always optimal for the firm to delegate the task to the 
bad agent. 
 
3.    Why does a small firm reject a good agent more often than a large firm? 
 
We start with the analysis on the case where the large and small firms only delegate 
their tasks to the bad agents.    The firm’s optimization problem is to design a menu of 
contracts   to maximize ex ante expected profits, where (0,0) is the 
null contract and ( ) is the non-zero contract that is accepted only by the bad 
agent.  Define the information rent by 
)} , ( ); 0 , 0 {(
R R q t
R R q t ,
R R R
q t U θ − = .  We can then replace the 
transfers in each firm’s objective function as a function of information rents and 
outputs so that the new control variables are  )} , ( ), 0 , 0 {(
R R
q U .  Hence,  the  large  and 
small firms’ optimization problems (denoted by ( ) and ( ), respectively) can be 
written as follows: 
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  2              s u b j e c t   t o   ( 6 )   a n d   ( 7 ) .  
  One clearly sees that (
R
IR ) must be binding irrespective of problems ( ) or 
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0 q U θ ∆ < .  This leads 
to the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1    The profits of problems ( ) and ( ) are the same when both the large 
and small firms delegate the tasks only to the bad agents. 





Next, when a firm decides to delegate the task to both types, its problem is in 
designing a menu of contracts  )} , ( ); , {( q t q t   to maximize the expected profits, where 
( q t, ) and ( ) ,q t  are designed to attract the good and the bad agents, respectively.  
Define the corresponding good agent and the bad agent’s information rents by 
q t U θ − =  and  q t U θ − = .  We then replace the transfers in each firm’s objective 
function as a function of information rents and outputs so that the new control 
variables are  )} , ( ), , {( q U q U .  Hence, the optimization problems of the large and 
small firms (denoted by ( ) and ( ), respectively) are written as follows: 
( ) :        
b P s P
b P
)} , ( ); , {(
max
q U q U
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              s u b j e c t   t o   
               q U U θ ∆ + ≥    (IC )                                  ( 8 )  
               q U U θ ∆ − ≥    (IC )                                  ( 9 )  
               0 U U ≥         (IR)                                  ( 1 0 )  
               0 ≥ U .          (IR )                                  ( 1 1 )  
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q U q U
) ) 1 ( ( ) ) , ( )( 1 ( ) ) , ( ( U U q q q R q q q R cs cs ν ν θ ν θ ν − + − − − + −  
              s u b j e c t   t o   ( 8 )   t o   ( 1 1 ) .  
 
    L e t   b π  and  s π  denote the optimal values of problems ( ) and ( ), 
respectively.  Note that because of  , the optimal value of problem ( ) is 
weakly larger than that of problem ( ) for any incentive feasible contract.    However, 
is there any time that the optimal value 
b P s P
cs cb q q > b P
s P
b π   is strictly larger than the optimal value s π ?  
Straightforward arguments show that constraints (8) through (11) define five possible 
regimes, which are the following.     
       R 1     (IC )(IR )             b i n d i n g  
       R 2     (IC )(IR )(IR)        binding 
       R 3         (IR )(IR)        binding 
       R 4         (IR )(IR)(IC )    binding 
  3       R 5             (IR)(IC )    binding. 
     In what follows, we index each of the solutions to these problems with a 
superscript “ ” that represents second-best, and subscripts “b” and “s” that 
correspondingly represent problems ( ) and ( .    Depending on the value of  , 
the solutions (see Proposition A.1 and Proposition A.2 in Appendix) to these problems 
are classified into the following two cases.     
SB
b P ) s P 0 U
 
Case 1:    For regime 1, 2, or 3, both solutions fall into the same regime 
This case occurs when 
*
0 q U θ ∆ < , and the solutions to both problems are the 
same.  The optimal (second best) output of the good (bad) agent is equal to (not 
larger than) the first best output, 
* q  (
*
q ), irrespective of 
SB
b q  or 
SB
s q  (
SB
b q or 
SB
s q ).  
This implies that  b π  is identical to  s π .  The combined effect of the capital-like 
resource restriction and the rent extraction-efficiency trade-off under asymmetric 
information does not make the small firm worse in this case. 
 
Case 2:  The solution to problem ( ) falls into regime 4 or 5, and the solution 
to problem ( ) falls into regime 5   
b P
s P
This case occurs when 
*
0 q U θ ∆ ≥ , and here firms confront the situation of 
countervailing incentives.  In order to attract the good agent who has handsome 
outside opportunities, a generous payment is necessary.  Such a contract appears 





q =   for both firms.    Without the capital-like resource restriction, 
the output of the good agent is distorted upwards to mitigate the bad agent’s 
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CI SB
b q q = if 
CI q U θ ∆ ≥ 0 , where 
CI q  is  given  by: 








CI q S ,                                     ( 1 2 )  
where the superscript “CI ” represents countervailing  incentives.   
For the reason that the incremental value of  ) , (
* q q R  (over  ) q  is zero when 
q  is larger than 
* q , it is now too costly for the small firm to mitigate the information 
rent of the bad agent by distorting the good agent’s output upwards.  The  small  firm, 
with the capital-like resource restriction, will leave the good agent’s output at the 
first-best level, i.e. 
* q q
SB
s = .  As the small firm’s second-best solution is incentive 
feasible to the large firm and the large firm takes another choice,  b π  is therefore 
strictly larger than  s π   when the good agent’s outside opportunities are good enough 
(or the difference between the two types’ status quo utility levels is large enough).  
The combined effect of the capital-like resource restriction and the rent 
extraction-efficiency trade-off under asymmetric information does make the small 
firm worse in this case.    This leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1  If the difference between the two types’ status quo utility levels is 
large enough, then the small firm will reject the good agent more often than the large 
  4firm. 
 
By Propositions A.1 and A.2 in Appendix, we obtain Proposition 2 below.   
 
Proposition 2  When the countervailing incentive exists (i.e. the solutions fall into 
case 2) and when both firms want to delegate the tasks to both types, the good agent 
produces more output in the large firm and gets a higher payment. 
 
    The prevalence of the scenario that larger firms pay higher wages is well 
documented in the economic literature (Oi and Idson, 1999), yet the explanations for 
such significant premiums paid by large firms remain incomplete.  The findings of 
Propositions 1 and 2 contribute some new explanations on why large firms pay higher 
wages.    For the results that small firms will reject good agents more often than large 
firms and good agents are more productive in large firms, this paper supports the 
labor quality explanation that larger firms employ higher-quality workers (e.g. 
Hamermesh, 1993; Brown and Medoff, 1989; Reilly, 1995) and also supports the 
productivity hypothesis that workers are more productive in large firms and therefore 





This paper proposes a contractual game to analyze the employment problems 
confronted by a large firm and a small firm.  We find that if the difference between 
the two types’ status quo utility levels is large enough, then the small firm will reject 
the good agent more often than the large firm.  The reason behind this result is not 
that the surplus generated by the small firm and the good agent cannot afford the good 
type’s status quo utility, but rather the capital-like resource restriction interferes with 
the willingness of the small firm to mitigate the information rent caused by the 
countervailing incentive.  Moreover, when the countervailing incentive exists and 
when both firms want to delegate the tasks to both types, the good agent will produce 
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< .  
Also note that, depending on the value of  , the solution of problem ( ) falls into 
one of five different regimes defined in section 3.   
0 U b P
 
Proposition A.1:    (For the proof, see Laffont and Martimort, 2002, pp101-104.) 




q U θ ∆ < , then the solution falls into regime (1), 
* * * , ,
SB SB SB SB SB q U q q q q θ ∆ = = =  and  0 =
SB
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q U q θ θ ∆ ≥ ≥ ∆ , then the solution falls into regime (2), 
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 and  0 =
SB
U . 
3.  If 
*
0
* q U q θ θ ∆ > > ∆ , then the solution falls into regime (3), 
0
* * , , U U q q q q
SB SB SB = = =  and  0 =
SB
U . 
4.  If 
*
0 q U q
CI θ θ ∆ ≥ ≥ ∆ , then the solution falls into regime (4), 
0
* 0 , , U U q q
U
q




 and  0 =
SB
U . 
5.  If 
CI q U θ ∆ > 0 , then the solution falls into regime (5),   
0
*
, , U U q q q q
SB SB CI SB = = =  and  0 0 > ∆ − =
CI SB
q U U θ . 
Similarly, depending on the value of  , the solution of problem ( ) falls into one 
of five different regimes defined in section 3.   
0 U s P
 
Proposition A.2: 
1.  If 
*
0 q U θ ∆ < , then the outcomes are the same as outcomes 1-3 in Proposition 
A.1. 
2.  If 
*
0 q U θ ∆ ≥ , then the solution falls into regime (5), where: 
0
* * , , U U q q q q
SB SB SB = = =  and  0
*
0 ≥ ∆ − = q U U
SB
θ . 
Proof:    For the proof of result 1, see Laffont and Martimort, 2002.    We focus on the 
case of 
*
0 q U θ ∆ ≥ .  Note that the bad type will pretend to be the good type if 
the small firm adopts the first-best solution (i.e., proposing ( ) , 0
* U q  and ( 0 ,
*
q ) 
for the good type and the bad type, respectively).  We presume that (IC ) and 
(IR ) are irrelevant so that both (IC ) and (IR) are binding.  The small firm’s 
problem can be simplified to the following problem ( ).  
'
s P
( ):  
'
s P ) )( 1 ( ( ) ) , ( )( 1 ( ) ) , ( ( max 0 0
* *
} , {
q U U q q q R q q q R
q q
θ ν ν θ ν θ ν ∆ − − + − − − + −  
   As the expected reduction of information rent does not depend on the bad type’s 
output  q, the maximization of ( ) needs no distortion away from the bad type’s 






= .  Because of the capital-like resource 
restriction (i.e.  cs q
* q = ), increasing the good type’s output by an infinitesimal 
amount does not increase  ) , (
* q q R  any more when  q is larger than 
* q .  It is 
therefore not worthwhile for the small firm to distort the good type’s output level 
upwards in order to mitigate the information rent caused by the countervailing 
incentive, i.e. the binding (IC ) constraint.  As a result, the maximization with 
respect to  q yields  .
* q q
SB =   To validate this approach, one needs to check 
the presumption about ( ) IC  and ( ) IR , i.e. 
* *
0 0 ) ( q q U U θ θ ∆ + ∆ − ≥  and 
0
*
0 ≥ ∆ − q U θ .  The former inequality is correct obviously, while the latter one 
is automatically satisfied owing to the premise of result 2.    ¾ 
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